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Abstract
Biometric verification systems are currently being deployed in numerous large-scale and
everyday applications. Among other vulnerabilities, presentation attacks directed to the
sensor (e.g., using a face mask or a gummy finger) pose a severe security threat. To prevent
such attacks, presentation attack detection (PAD) techniques have been proposed in the
last decade. For the particular case of fingerprint recognition, most approaches are based
on conventional optical or capacitive sensors, acquiring a single image, and which can thus
detect only a limited number of materials used to fool the sensor.
In this paper we propose a PAD algorithm based on normalised spectral signatures
extracted from Short Wave InfraRed (SWIR) images captured at four different wavelengths.
It has been shown that the information contained in the selected SWIR wavelengths can
help to discriminate skin from other materials. The extracted features are classified using
a Support Vector Machine (SVM), thereby yielding a fast real-time performance which can
be implemented on almost any application. The experimental evaluation shows that all
but one material considered can be detected, including unknown materials (i.e., not used
to train the classifier).
1 Introduction
Biometrics refers to automated recognition of individuals based on their biological (e.g., iris
or fingerprint) or behavioural (e.g., signature or voice) characteristics [1]. Certainly, biometric
recognition is very attractive and useful for the final user: forget about PINs and passwords,
you are your own key [1]. In addition, they provide a stronger link between the subject and
the action or event. All these facts have allowed a wide deployment of biometric systems in the
last decade for different applications, ranging from border control to smartphone unlocking.
In spite of their numerous advantages, biometric systems are vulnerable to external attacks.
Among the different possible points of attack summarised in [2], the biometric capture device is
probably the most exposed one: in order to launch an attack on the capture device, no further
knowledge about the inner functioning of the system is required. Such attacks are known in the
literature as presentation attacks and defined within the ISO/IEC 30107 standard on biometric
presentation attack detection [3] as the “presentation to the biometric data capture subsystem
with the goal of interfering with the operation of the biometric system”. In other words, an
attacker can present the capture device with a presentation attack instrument (PAI), such as
a gummy finger or a fingerprint overlay, in order to impersonate someone else (i.e., active
impostor) or to avoid being recognised due to black-listing (i.e., identity concealer).
In order to prevent such attacks, presentation attack detection (PAD) methods have been
proposed for several biometric characteristics, including iris [4, 5], fingerprint [6, 7] or face
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[8]. This term refers to any technique that is able to automatically distinguish between bona
fide (i.e., real or live) presentations and access attempts carried out by means of PAIs [9] and
has attracted a considerable attention within the last decade. In fact, several international
projects, like the European Tabula Rasa [10] and BEAT [11], or the more recent US Odin
research program [12] deal with these security concerns. In addition, the LivDet – liveness
detection competition series on iris and fingerprint [13] have been running since 2009.
As any other pattern recognition task, PAD techniques can benefit from data acquired with
different sensors, thereby providing complementary sources of information [4, 7]. In particular,
the use of multi-spectral technologies have been studied for face [14, 15] and fingerprint [16, 17]
in the Near InfraRed (NIR) domain. In addition, Hengfoss et al. [18] analysed extensively the
multi-spectral signatures of living against the cadaver fingers using spectroscopy techniques for
wavelengths between 400 nm and 1630 nm. However, no PAIs were analysed in their work.
In contrast to the NIR wavelengths under 850 nm used in most of the aforementioned
articles, it has been shown that human skin shows characteristic remission properties for multi-
spectral SWIR wavelengths, which are independent of a person’s age, gender or skin type [19].
Based on this principle, Steiner et al. described in [15, 20] a new skin detection approach based
on the spectral signatures extracted from wavelengths ranging from 935 nm to 1550 nm. The
authors trained a system based on a Support Vector Machine (SVM) to discriminate skin vs.
non-skin (e.g., hair or make-up) pixels, thereby enabling a fast classification process. In their
experiments on facial images partially covered with masks, hair or make-up, they achieved a
pixelwise classification accuracy over 99.9%.
Inspired by the skin detection method presented in [15, 20], we propose a PAD method
based on the spectral signatures of finger samples captured in the range 1200 nm – 1550 nm.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first fingerprint PAD method exploring SWIR imaging.
In particular, pixels are classified as skin or non-skin, and a final decision (i.e., bona fide or
presentation attack) for the complete sample is made based on the proportion of non-skin
pixels detected. We have tested a wide variety of PAI species including both complete thick
gummy fingers and more challenging overlays, fabricated with twelve different materials, and
successfully detected all materials but one.
It should be highlighted that only six samples where used for training, thus being able to
test the remaining six materials as unknown attacks (i.e., attacks not seen previously by the
classifier, thereby representing a bigger challenge and a better representation of a real-world
scenario). Even if large databases comprising thousands of bona fides are freely available, this
is not the case for all PAIs. In particular, the LivDet competitions [13] offer large databases
comprising bona fides and PAIs. However, only a few distinct PAIs are considered. Therefore,
being able to train the system with a small number of samples, stemming from a reduced
number of PAIs, is crucial to be able to detect unknown attacks. The pixel-wise classification
of the proposed method allows the use of such a small training set.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. The SWIR sensor and PAD method proposed
are described in Sect. 2. Then the experimental protocol and the results obtained are presented
in Sect. 3. Final conclusions are drawn in Sect. 4.
2 Proposed Presentation Attack Detection
Method
We describe in this section both the capture device and the PAD method proposed in detail.
In particular, we define the normalised spectral signatures for each pixel and the classification
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Figure 1: Finger sensor diagram. On the left, the complete box showing the open slot to place
the finger for the acquisition. On the right, a diagram of the inner components: two different
sensors for the SWIR images and the visible (VIS) light images, together with the corresponding
LEDs.
algorithm to reach a final bona fide vs. presentation attack decision for the sample at hand.
2.1 Short Wave InfraRed (SWIR) Imaging
A diagram of the finger SWIR capturing device developed for the present work is included
in Fig. 1. As it may be observed, the camera and lens are placed inside a closed box, which
includes an open slot on the top. When the finger is placed there, all ambient light is blocked
and therefore only the desired wavelengths are used for the acquisition. In particular, we have
used a Hamamatsu InGaAs SWIR sensor array, which captures 64 × 64 px images, with a 25
mm fixed focal length lens optimised for wavelengths within 900 – 1700 nm. In this article, we
have considered the following SWIR wavelengths: 1200 nm, 1300 nm, 1450 nm, and 1550 nm,
similar to the wavelengths considered in [15, 20] for the skin vs. non-skin facial classification.
An example of the acquired images for a bona fide sample is shown in Fig. 2a for the 1200
nm wavelength. In addition, fingerprint verification can be carried out with contactless finger
photos acquired in the visible spectrum with a 1.3 MP camera and a 35 mm VIS-NIR lens,
which are placed next to the SWIR sensor within the closed box (see Fig. 1).
In order to process the images, the central finger-slot region corresponding to the open slot
where the finger is placed needs to be extracted from the background. Given that the finger is
always placed over the open slot, and the camera does not move, a simple fixed size cropping
can be applied. The corresponding bona fide samples for all SWIR wavelengths, with a size of
18× 58 px, are depicted in Fig. 2b to 2e.
Finally, samples acquired from three PAIs fabricated with different materials are included
in Fig. 3: (a) to (d) a silicone finger, (e) to (h) a dragon skin overlay, and (i) to (l) an orange
playdoh finger. Some differences may be observed if we compare the images to those captured
from a bona fide presentation in Fig. 2. Whereas for the bona fide, the images show a decrease
in the intensity value for bigger wavelengths, this is not the case for the silicone and the dragon
skin. Such trend will be hence exploited by the PAD method.
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 2: Bona fide samples: (a) complete image at 1200 nm, and cropped finger-slot regions,
where each image was captured at (b) 1200 nm, (c) 1300 nm, (d) 1450 nm, and (e) 1550 nm,
respectively.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
Figure 3: Cropped finger-slot regions corresponding to several presentation attack instruments:
(a) to (d) silicone finger, (e) to (h) dragon skin overlay, and (i) to (l) playdoh finger. In all
cases, each image was captured at 1200 nm, 1300 nm, 1450 nm, and 1550 nm, respectively.
We may also see in both Fig. 2 and 3 that the upper and lower ends of the finger present a
non-uniform illumination and reflections. For this reason, the PAD algorithm will only analyse
the central part of the images, thus yielding a final ROI comprising 18× 20 px (see Fig. 4).
2.2 Spectral Signatures
Similar to [15, 20], the spectral signature ss of a pixel with coordinates (x, y) is defined as:
ss (x, y) = (i1, . . . , iN ) (1)
where in represents the intensity value for the nth wavelength. In our particular case study,
N = 4.
In order to account for illumination changes, and therefore achieve a signature independent of
the absolute brightness of the image at hand, a normalised signature is computed. In addition,
in order to capture the distinct trends accross different wavelengths shown in Fig. 2 for the
bona fides (i.e., skin pixels) and in Fig. 3 for the PAIs (i.e., non-skin pixels), a final normalised
difference vector is computed as follows:
d [ia, ib] =
ia − ib
ia + ib
(2)
with a, b ≤ N , a 6= b and −1 ≤ d [ia, ib] ≤ 1. In other words, the normalised differences between
all possible wavelength combinations are computed. For our case study with N = 4, a total
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Figure 4: Selected ROI comprising the central 18 × 20 px from the images acquired at each
wavelength.
number of six differences are calculated:
d (x, y) = (d [i1, i2] , d [i1, i3] , d [i1, i4] , d [i2, i3] , d [i2, i4] , d [i3, i4]) (3)
These normalised difference vectors d (x, y) will be used to classify skin vs. non-skin pixels.
2.3 Final Classification
The final bona fide vs. presentation attack decision for the sample at hand is made in a two
step manner:
• For each pixel with coordinates (x, y), the normalised spectral signature d (x, y) is com-
puted and classified as skin vs. non-skin with a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier.
• Given that a single sample comprises a total number of 18× 20 = 360 px per wavelength,
the final score s returned by the PAD method will be the proportion of non-skin pixels of
the sample ROI in a range of 0 to 100, as per [21].
In other words, regarding the final score s ∈ [0, 100] generated by the PAD algorithm, low
values close to 0 will represent bona fide samples and high values close to 100 will denote
presentation attacks.
It should be finally noted that, whereas other high performing state of the art methods
need a high number of images for training, up to 1000, the present method, being based on a
pixelwise classification, requires a very low number of images for training. In our experiments,
only six images per class are utilised.
3 Experimental Evaluation
The PAD algorithm proposed in Sect. 2 is evaluated in this section. First, the database and
evaluation metrics are described. We subsequently present and analyse the results obtained.
3.1 Experimental Setup
In the experiments, we have analysed the following twelve different PAIs:
• 3D printed fingerprint and 3D printed fingerprint coated with silver paint (denoted Ag)
to mimic the conductive properties of the skin;
• fingers fabricated with blue and green wax, gelatine, playdoh, silly putty and silicone;
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Figure 5: Normalised score distributions for bona fide (green) and PA (red) presentations. As
it can be observed, only three scores yielded by PAs overlap with the scores stemming from
bona fide presentations.
• overlays fabricated with dragon skin and urethane;
• fingerprints printed on regular matte paper and on transparency paper.
Regarding the bona fide samples, in order to maximise their variability, they have been captured
from all fingers, from the little one to the thumb. For each bona fide and PAI, between two
and three samples have been acquired.
Following common practices to achieve a balanced training of the classifier, the same number
of samples (six) have been used for each class, namely: bona fides and PAs. For the latter,
the following six different materials have been chosen: dragon skin overlay, urethane overlay,
playdoh finger, printed fingerprint on matte paper, printed fingerprint on transparency paper
and silly putty finger. Since in total twelve different materials have been analysed, the remaining
six PAIs can be considered unknown attacks, thereby allowing us to test the robustness of the
classifier in this more challenging scenario.
Finally, in compliance with the ISO/IEC IS 30107-3 on Biometric presentation attack de-
tection - Part 3: Testing and Reporting [22], the following metrics are used to evaluate the
performance of the PAD method:
• Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER): percentage of attack presenta-
tions wrongly classified as bona fide presentations.
• Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER): percentage of bona fide pre-
sentations wrongly classified as presentation attacks.
3.2 Results
The score distribution for the bona fide presentations (green) and the PA (red) are depicted
in Fig. 5. As it may be observed, there is a very small overlap between both distributions:
whereas all bona fide presentations achieve scores lower than 10 (i.e., less than 10% of their
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Figure 6: Scores yielded by each presenation, ordered by PAI species or bona fide along the y
axis.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 7: Example of a noisy image for the green wax finger, captured at (a) 1200 nm, (b) 1300
nm, (c) 1450 nm, and (d) 1550 nm.
pixels are incorrectly classified as non-skin), only a single PAI (the playdoh finger), from which
three samples have been acquired, achieves such a low score. Therefore, both classes are easily
separable.
In order to further analyse the performance of the PAD method, all scores are presented in
Fig. 6, classified along the y axis according to their origin: either bona fide or a particular PAI.
For most of the bona fide samples, the score is 0 (i.e., all pixels are classified as skin), and all
scores lie under 3 (i.e., less than 3% of the pixels are incorrectly classified).
Regarding the different PAIs considered, it may be observed that all playdoh finger samples
achieve also a score of 0. This is due to the similarity in the responses to the selected wavelengths
with respect to the bona fides, as it may be seen in Figs. 2b to 2e (bona fide) and Figs. 3i to 3j
(playdoh PAI). On the other hand, all the remaining PAIs can be discriminated from bona
fides with a threshold below 10. Moreover, most of the remaining PAIs yield scores over 80
(i.e., over 80% of the pixels are correctly classified as non-skin). Among the exceptions one of
the green wax finger samples shows a remarkably lower score (15 vs. 75 – 85 for the remaining
samples). This is due to a noisy acquisition, as shown in Fig. 7. In spite of that fact, the PA
is still correctly detected.
In summary, the overall performance of the PAD algorithm for decision threshold on 5 (i.e.,
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at least 5% of the pixels in the ROI are classified as non-skin) yields an APCER = 5.7% for
BPCER = 0%, thereby granting a highly secure (low APCER) and convenient (low BPCER)
system.
It should be finally highlighted that all unknown PAIs (i.e., both 3D printed fingerprints,
blue and green wax fingers, gelatine finger and silicone finger) are correctly detected as PAs.
That means the classifier is robust to all previously unseen attacks considered, thereby proving
the soundness of the approach. Such success is due to the fact that most materials, excluding
the orange playdoh tested, exhibit a similar behaviour to each other for the selected SWIR
bands, and at the same time different from the bona fides. We may thus conclude that the
proposed sensor and algorithm are able to detect unknown attacks.
4 Conclusions
We have presented a novel fingerprint presentation attack detection approach based on spectral
signatures extracted from SWIR images. Contrary to other high performing PAD algorithms,
since classification is performed in a pixelwise fashion, very few samples are required for training
(six bona fides and six PAIs in our experimental evaluation). This allows for a robust training
in spite of the lack of freely available databases comprising a wide variety of PAIs.
The experiments have shown that all bona fide samples are correctly classified as such, thus
yielding a highly convenient system. On the other hand, all materials except for playdoh are also
detected as PAs. Even unknown attacks are correctly detected, thereby showing the promising
performance of the proposed method. This is due to the similarities exhibited by most PAIs at
the selected SWIR bands, and their difference with respect to the bona fides behaviour.
In addition, given the reduced number of pixels of the final ROI considered (360 px, see
Fig. 4), the low dimensionality of the feature vector (6) and the use of an SVM classifier,
samples are classified in a fast and efficient manner. We can thus conclude that the proposed
PAD method can be utilised for real-time applications.
As future work lines, we will acquire a bigger database, comprising more PAIs and more
bona fide samples, in order to further test the performance of the algorithm to both known
and unknown attacks. We will also explore other feature extraction techniques to deal with the
undetected PAIs (playdoh finger) including both other algorithms trained on the same SWIR
data and other acquisition technologies.
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